The aim of the presented paper is to show that there is a need for assessment of basic assumptions of the disability conception concentrated upon normalization, because this is still the most important and the most significant conception, in particular, in the practice of rehabilitation. However, I want to attract attention to the fact that accusations against normalization are in concord, to a degree, with some of the views of critics of the social model of disability. For instance, Bill Hughes and Kevin Patterson are of the opinion that concentrating solely upon social influences in the 'production' of disability 'passes on the body-related aspects of disability to the reactionary and oppressive discursive space' (Hughes, & Patterson, 1997, p. 328). In turn, Dan Goodley emphasizes that developmental disorders, conceptually differentiated from socialized disabilities, are treated only and exclusively as medical or psychological problems which can be 'eliminated or rehabilitated' (Goodley, 2001, p. 209). For the functioning of disabled individuals, it is also of importance what people themselves struggle with in relation to 'the truth', which defines them, what kind of behavior they display, how they are shaped for the purpose of managing their own lives. Therefore, it is important how they create their own subjectivity, and what kind of problems they encounter in this sphere, because it is through the identification of this struggle rather than through determining what is good, and what is not good for them, what is normal, and what is not, that important challenges for special education emerge. It is about creating space for 'struggle for subjectivity', the space which will be encompassing both disabled individuals and everyone who is involved in research into these issues, because we have to remember that both parents and teachers, those in charge of upbringing and therapists alike, also exist in the relationships of power, subjectivity and self-government. Therefore, they ought to be provided with the opportunity to understand the forces which shape, among others, disabled individuals, but which also shape those referred to in the previous sentence, their identity and also their own actions. I hope that the remarks contained in this paper will open a new space for the subjectivity of disabled individuals, and that it will encourage those who are inclined to collaborate with them to research these problems and find their own solutions to them.

References


